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RIGHT OF THE TRIAL COURT TO INSTRUCT AND
ALLOW RECOVERY ON EVIDENCE INADMIS-
SIBLE UNDER THE PLEADINGS BUT RE-
CEIVED WITHOUT OBJECTION
On the question of the right of a trial court to instruct and allow re-
covery on evidence inadmissible under the pleadings, but received
without objection, there is a diversity of opinion in different jurisdic-
tions,' while in Missouri the decisions are discordant.1 It is well settled,
however, that where such evidence is admitted and the adverse party
asks instructions upon it himself, he is precluded from later complain-
ing,' since he has adopted the error as his own. Nor can an instruction
be given which contradicts the allegations of a party's pleadings even
though evidence in support of it may have been admitted without objec-
tion,4 This would permit a party to recover upon a different cause of
action than that alleged, and amounts to a failure of proof.
There are decisions in Missouri which deny the right of a trial
court to instruct on any issues other than those made by the pleadings.
Such language as: "a party can only recover on the case he makes in
his pleadings '", or "No rule is better settled than that which holds a
plaintiff to a recovery upon the specific acts of negligence averred
and upon no other,"6 clearly negative the right. There are a number
of other cases, however, which hold that where evidence inadmissible
under the pleadings is received without objection, which evidence con-
stitutes a variance and not a failure of proof, such variance is waived
by failure to make timely objection, and the trial court may instruct
and allow recovery upon it unless the party takes the steps provided
by statute.7
IThompson on Trials (2nd Edition), Sections 2309, 2312.
2See Litton vs. Railroad, III Mo. App. 140, 145.
3 McDonald & Co. vs. Cash & Hinds, 45 Mo. App. 81.
Hilz \s. Railway, 101 Mo. 36.
Strother vs. De Witt, 98 Mo. App. 293.
4 Bruce vs. Sims, 34 Mo. 246.
Capitol Bank vs. Armstrong, et al., 62 Mo. 59.
Iron Mountain Bank vs. Murdock, 62 Mo. 70.
5 Glass et al. vs. Gelvin, 80 Mo. 297, 302.
' Wilder vs. Railroads, 164 Mo. App. 114, 121.
7 Brown vs. Railroad, 31 Mo. App. 661.
Hensler vs. Stix, 113 Mo. App. 162.
Ingwersen vs. Railroad, 116 Mo. Anp. 139
Carson vs. Quinn, 127 Mo. App. 525.
Seni vs. Railroad, 112 Mo. App. 74.
Chouquette vs. Railroad, 152 Mo. 257.
And cases cited infra.
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The rule stated is predicated upon the proposition that such evi-
dence does not constitute a failure of proof,8 and some of the decisions
can be reconciled by the failure of the court to properly distinguish
between a variance and a failure of proof. An examination of two
conflicting cases will illustrate this point.
In Price v. Railroad' the plaintiff alleged that he was injured in
alighting from the train due to defendant's failure to stop a reason-
able time to permit him to leave the cars. Evidence was admitted
without objection that the station was not lighted, and the defendant
cross-examined the plaintiff and other witnesses upon this point. An
instruction was given for the plaintiff upon this evidence and the case
on appeal was reversed for this error. The majority opinion declared
this constituted a failure of proof and to allow recovery thereon would
permit the plaintiff to recover on a different cause of action than that
alleged, and furthermore, they held, the instructions can never enlarge
the issues made by the pleadings despite the fact that such evidence is
received without objection. In a strong dissenting opinion Nortoni, J.,
held this a mere variance, and if the defendant failed to file the affi-
davit of surprise provided by statute10 he must be deemed to have
waived the variance.
In accord with this dissenting opinion is Litton v. Railroad."
Here the plaintiff alleged his cattle were killed due to defendant's
negligence in failing to maintain a fence as provided by statute. On
the trial plaintiff proved without objection that the animals got upon
the track through a gate negligently left open; this evidence was con-
ceded to be inadmissible under the pleadings. The court over the
defendant's objection instructed on this evidence and on appeal the
trial court was sustained. The minority opinion in Price v. Railroad
and the foregoing appear to be correct in principle and more in keep-
ing with the spirit of the code. A failure of proof is said to exist
"Where the allegation of the cause of action or defense to which the
proof is directed is unproved, not in some particular or particulars
only, but in its entire scope and meaning."" In Price v. Railroad the
plaintiff complained that his right as a passenger was violated by certain
negligent acts of the defendant and the evidence disclosed that such
right was violated not only by the specified negligent act, but also by
8 See Section 2021 R. S. 1909.
972 Mo. 414.10 Section 1846, R. S. 1909.
1 Section 2021, R. S. 1909.
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another negligent act. Certainly the latter evidence does not fail to
support the allegation of the petition "in its entire scope and meaning"
since the gravamen of the complaint is negligence to the plaintiff as a
passenger It is only a variance and so holds Litton v. Railroad and
other analogous cases.1 2
The statutes provide that "No variance between the allegation in
the pleading and the proof shall be deemed material, unless it has ac-
tually misled the adverse party, to his prejudice, in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits; when it shall be alleged that a party
has been misled, that fact shall be proved to the satisfaction of the
court, by affidavit showing in what respect he has been misled, and
thereupon the court may order the pleadings to be amended upon
such terms as shall be just."1 4 If the evidence constitutes not a failure
of proof but a variance between the allegata and probata and the
adverse party fails to object to the admission of such evidence, that in
itself is strong proof that he has not been misled to his prejudice and
if he fails to file the affidavit as provided in the section quoted, then
the variarce must be deemed immaterial and the court has the power
either before or after judgment to amend the pleading to conform to
the evidence." If the adverse party has failed to file the affidavit as pro-
vided and thereby deprived the other party of his right to have the
pleading amended, 16 surely he should not have the case reversed by rea-
son of a variance which ought to be deemed immaterial. In such a
case it can not be said a party's substantial rights are disregarded and
such error, if there be any, is no ground for reversal. 17 Further-
more, for the fault of a party in failing to make timely objection to
the introduction of evidence and in filing his affidavit to enable the
court to determine whether the variance has been material, there
should be no reversal since "It shall be the duty of the courts to so
construe the provisions of law relating to pleadings as to place the
party not in fault as nearly as possible in the same condition he would
12 111 Mo. App. 140.
"Von Tuebra vs. Gas Light Co., 209 Mo. 648.
Mellor vs. Railroad, 105 Mo. 455, 470.
14 Section 184, R. S. 1909.
15 Sections 1848, 1851, R. S. 1909.
16 Mellor vs. Railroad, 105 Mo. 455, 471.
17 Section 1850, R. S. 1909, "The court shall, in every stage of the action,
disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings which shall not
affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be
rexersed or affected by reason of such error or defect."
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be in if no mistake had been made."18 The fault of the party in not
pursuing the steps enumerated above has prevented the other party
from amending his pleading and if anyone should suffer, it should be
the party in fault.
Price v. Railroad has never been directly overruled and in some
subsequent cases has been followed. 19 The cases last cited state that
the plaintiff can recover only upon the specific act of negligence averred,
a proposition entirely too broad. Price v. Railroad may be considered
discredited by Litton v. Railroad and the cases following it.20
Most of the foregoing discussion has been devoted to evidence
inadmissible under the petition, but received without objection. The
same principles apply to defenses inadmissible under the answer. Thus
in Hill v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co. 21 the defendant put in a general denial
and without objection was allowed to introduce evidence of contri-
butory negligence. The refusal of the trial court to instruct for the
defendant on this point was held error. The defect in the defendant's
pleading was held to have been waived. In Gibson Bros. v. Jenkins 22
Smith, J., declared the waiver of the question of pleading was limited
to cases where the unobjected to testimony tends to establish an un-
pleaded defense which is not new matter. This language was used in a
rehearing of the case and, as in the first hearing of the case, it had been
decided that sufficient and timely objection had been made to the evi-
dence in question, it must be regarded as dictum. It is inconsistent
with language used by the same judge in Carter v. Shotwell" and
'
8 Section 1865, R. S. 1909.
19 Wilder vs. Street Railway Co., 164 Mo. App. 114. Plaintiff alleged
negligence and on trial evidence made a case under the humanitarian doc-
trine and jury were instructed thereon. Reversed for error.
Orcutt vs. Century Bldg. Co., 201 Mo. 424, 443.
Hamilton vs. Railway Co., 114 Mo. App. 504. These and other cases
persist in laying down unqualifiedly the rule that the plaintiff can recover only
upon the specific act of negligence averred. These cases cannot be reconciled
with the other cases cited.
20Later decisions o the Supreme Court are in direct conflict with Price
vs. Railroad. See Fisher & Co. vs. Realty Co., 159 Mo. 562, and State ex rel
United Rys. Co. vs. Reynolds, 257 Mo. 19 wherein Litton vs. Railroad is ap-
proved, 1. c., 28.
21140 Mo. 433.
297 Mo. App. 27, 38.
2342 Mo. App. 663. Defendant pleaded general denial but evidence tended
to show fraud. Court refused to instruct on the fraud issue. Case reversed
on another point but the court held the defendant was entitled to the instruc-
tion as the plaintiff had waived the defect by failure to object. See to the
same effect Stewart vs. Goodrich, 9 Mo. App. 125.
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Madison v. Railroad.24 There is more reason to allow the defendani
this privilege than the plaintiff since, if the former loses his opportunity
to use a defense to the action, final judgment for the plaintiff will be
conclusive against him even though he may have a good defense to the
action, whereas the plaintiff may generally bring a new action and
remedy his petition. M.R.S.
60 Mo. App. 599.
Washington University Open Scholarship
